Russia may have identified a new Mediterranean Sea base and could resume conventional submarine operations by Spring 2025
Departure of MV Sparta IV, Aleksandr Shabalin and a Kilo class submarine suggest Russia may be shipping military equipment for its own forces and could re-establish a Mediterranean Sea SSK presence
Background
Following the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, the loss of Tartus port facilities severely curtailed Russian Naval aspirations and operations not only in the Levant region but the entire Mediterranean Sea area.
With no base from which to stage, Russia’s ability to operate conventional submarines was lost and embarrassingly, Black Sea Fleet Kilo (T636.3) B-261 “Novorossiysk” was forced to withdraw from the Mediterranean theatre after only three months deployed. This was not only a huge loss of operational capability to Russia’s Mediterranean Sea Task Group (TG) but a blow to regional influence and a loss of prestige for the Russia Navy.1
The loss of Tartus also adversely affected Russian surface fleet operational tempo which slowed markedly after HTS took over. The main fighting force comprising Northern Fleet Pr.22350 class frigate SKR-456 “Admiral Golovko” and Black Sea Fleet Pr.11356 class frigate SKR-494 “Admiral Grigorovich” were largely confined to loitering in Syrian littoral waters likely protecting the military evacuation force comprising Russian MOD logistic transport vessels MV Sparta and MV Sparta II and the Northern Fleet Pr.11711 large landing ship BDK-010 “Ivan Gren” and Pr.775/II Ropucha class BDK-031 “Aleksandr Otrakovsky”.
Whilst MV Sparta and MV Sparta II were allowed to dock and remove an amount of Russian military materiel, the Northern Fleet large landing ships were not granted access probably to spare the sensitivities of the indigenous population and preserve the peace; the warships’ appearance would be a stark reminder of life under the Russian-backed Assad regime.
Sparta and Sparta II departed Tartus by 29 January 2025 and no Russian warships were evident in the Syrian littoral suggesting the whole TG departed the Levant area. OSINT imagery practitioner MT Anderson identified the Russian TG south east of Crete on 29 January heading west in formation. With no new base identified, it was assessed the TG would exit the Mediterranean Sea however, they have not been identified passing the Strait of Gibraltar westbound and therefore remain unlocated in the Mediterranean Sea fueling speculation on their whereabouts.
Alternatively, click HERE for the Tweet.
Transport ships depart the Baltic Sea
The departure of two Russian military transport vessels could be early signs that Russia may have reached, or expects to reach, a deal to operate from a new Mediterranean base (yet to be identified).
Russian arms carrying vessel MV Sparta IV and Baltic Fleet Pr.775/II Ropucha class large landing ship BDK-110 “Alexandr Shabalin” departed the Baltic sea on 27 January 2025 and from a visual perspective, appeared to be fully loaded. Strange behaviour for vessels, assessed at the time, of being enroute to Tartus to evacuate Russian equipment.
As both MV Sparta IV and Alexandr Shabalin enter the Mediterranean Sea on 3 February there is a realistic possibility Russia is bringing more equipment to the region, possibly making up a logistic shortfall lost when departing Tartus or delivering new/specialist equipment, suggesting there is a possibility Russia may have found new port to operate from.
Further Baltic departures
Signs that Russia may have struck a deal to access another port seemed more likely on 3 February 2025, when an unidentified Kilo T636.3 class conventional diesel-electric submarine (SSK) was visually identified departing the Baltic Sea escorted by Russian Navy Baltic Fleet Pr.712 Sliva class ocean-going tug “Evgeniy Churov”, a known submarine consort tug which escorted Kilo class B-261Novorossiysk to the Mediterranean Sea between August and September 2024.
Whilst the identity of the Kilo is not known, several candidates exist including Pacific Fleet Kilo B-608 “Mozhaisk”, Black Sea Fleet Kilo B-261 “Novorossiysk” and Black Sea Fleet Kilo B-265 “Krasnodar”.
Poor weather conditions in the Kattegat hampered identification however, this submarine is likely the same vessel which departed the Baltic on 29 December with tug “Sergey Balk” and returned on 9 January with SKR-531 “Soobrazitelny” after Sergey Balk broke down in the Kattegat. On that occasion Droxford Maritime assessed it was B-608 Mozhaisk however, it could also have been B-265 “Krasnodar”.
The fact that a Kilo class SSK has sailed out-of-area and is likely bound for the Mediterranean Sea is intriguing. The relative lower endurance of conventional submarines suggests Russia may have secured a port for the submarine to operate from. The departure of transport ships and the submarine coupled with the lack of evidence that the main Russian TG has yet to depart the Mediterranean Sea suggests Russia could have secured a regional port access deal possibly with Algeria or a Libya.
The SSK roulement option
Alternatively, if Russia hasn’t secured a port why sail a SSK? The forced departure of B-261 Novorossiysk in January 2025 left a huge capability gap which would have been keenly felt by the deployed TG. The Kilo class SSK is a formidable multirole platform and provides Russia with regional ASW, ASuW and Land-Attack options as well as offensive mining, reconnaissance and limited SOF delivery capability.
Russia’s need to regain operational capability, regional influence and prestige may have driven the Navy to consider and indeed try, submarine roulement deployments of around three months duration, without using ports or using short “pit stop” port visits to replenish fuel and provisions in order to extend SSK on-station times.
Russia certainly has the submarine platform availability and roulement deployments would likely cycle between Black Sea Fleet B-261 Novorossiysk & B-265 “Krasnodar” with newly commissioned and operationally-certified Pacific Fleet Kilo B-608 “Mozhaisk” (and could easily reach into 2026/27 timeframe with B-610 “Yakutsk”). It is a bold move but would address a key TG capability gap and herald the return of Russian SSKs to the Mediterranean Sea.
James Droxford is a former Navy and Intelligence Agency signals intelligence officer and Defence Intelligence (Maritime Branch) submarine desk officer/analyst. Now a civilian, he is an independent maritime intelligence producer, analyst and reporter.
Great assessment in connecting the dots. My guess is Moscow is negotiating a deal with Algeria. Benghazi could be a PLAN B after Tartus. But it lacks the infrastructure I think to handle Russian Kilos, even for pit stops. Algiers it seems is a much better choice but Italy gets a vote due to warming ties to Algiers. See Italian Compass on the trajectory of Algeria-Italian relations.
Krasnodar is more or less confirmed for the failed attempt to get out of Skagerak in JAN. The convoy including SPARTA. & SPARTA II has highly likely passed Sicily and is closer to Sardinia -way past the point where it would turn S for Bengazhi -Remains to be seen if the FFG'stay in the Med