A Russian Navy exercise in the Baltic Sea could mask asymmetric activity
As NATO enters the Easter break, a large-scale Russian Navy merchant ship protection exercise which began today could be the perfect cover for asymmetric activity.
According to Press statements, Russian Navy Baltic Fleet Forces commenced a navigation defence exercise in the Baltic Sea on 15 April 2025. Described by the Baltic Fleet Press Service as “comprehensive exercises to protect shipping” the statement added that “Up to 20 surface combat ships and support vessels are involved” comprising “about 5,000 servicemen, 10 aircraft as well as up to 100 units of combat and special equipment"
The multi-day exercise involves the escort and protection of civilian vessels from attack by UAV, USV, ships and submarines of a conditional enemy as well as providing emergency assistance and damage control services to civilian vessels damaged during such an attack. In addition, the Forces involved will practice the protection and defence of sea lines of communication and Fleet bases, likely a reference to Baltiysk, Kaliningrad, Pionerskiy, Khronstadt, Lomonsov and St. Petersburg facilities.
Comment
Whilst likely a culmination of the Russian Baltic Fleet Spring training programme it should be borne in mind that the exercise forces described in the Press statement represent almost the entirety of the Baltic Fleet Naval surface combatants, key auxiliaries, aircraft and personnel all of which have conducted medium-to-high levels of training during the first quarter of 2025.
From an information dissemination perspective, after six months of intensive C3 training1, Naval HQ Kaliningrad and subordinate HQs at Baltiysk Naval Station, St. Petersburg, Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation Command and their subordinate units are able to communicate at their most effective level since the Cold War and could transition to the highest states of readiness with little or no warning.
The exercise date coincides with Easter, a time when NATO’s physical presence, and perhaps more importantly its situational awareness and ability to rapidly react to incidents, is reduced. During this period it is common for Commands and I&W operations to operate at reduced manning levels, sometimes with junior staff at the helm and without the “day-shop” intelligence analysts who provide the critical continuity and context to developing activity.
It is highly likely Russian Forces exercise activity will fall outside normal patterns-of-life with particular increases in:
Naval fixed and rotary wing activity,
Increased incidents of AIS / GPS spoofing and
Weapon firing events by air/land/sea assets.
As the exercise progresses, Russian warships are highly likely to operate outside their normal work areas and only last week two Baltic Fleet Pr.21631 Buyan-M class missile corvettes, MRK-575 “Grad” and MRK-595 “Naro-Fominsk” were noted loitering in along the central Polish littoral well outside any extant PRIPs.
In summary, a reduced NATO presence and decreased vigilance coupled with an increase in Russian maritime (exercise) activity, particularly by an increasingly emboldened regime, are just the conditions to mask asymmetric warfare activity. I note that Baltic Fleet exercise activity may have been used to mask probable asymmetric activity in June 2022.
